ATLANTA — “Football,” Mauricio Pochettino said, “is in the details.” And it was in the details Saturday that the U.S. men’s national team faltered against Belgium.
There was no one reason for the USMNT’s unraveling in a 5-2 loss. There was, instead, a succession of minor individual shortcomings that magnified one broader flaw in Pochettino’s tactical setup.
“Pochettino should’ve never changed back to a back four,” says Charlie Davies, a former USMNT forward and columnist for The Athletic, “when he made so much progress with the back three this past fall.”
Lineups with three center backs helped revive the USMNT last September. Players and Pochettino himself said the new formation helped “simplify things.” In October and November, they alternated between hybrid systems, but never returned to a back four with two fullbacks bombing up and down both wings.
On Saturday, they did that — and they got burned.
Belgium’s first three goals, plus a fourth that was disallowed for a handball, all originated on the left wing, with the ball at the feet of the game’s most dangerous player, Jérémy Doku. And three of the four happened after Tim Weah, the U.S. right back tasked with defending Doku, was caught higher up the field.
He was higher up the field by design. In this more complicated 4-2-3-1 formation, when in possession, a central midfielder would drop between the center backs or to the left of them; an attacking midfielder would come deep; both fullbacks would advance.
It was the opposite of the 3-4-3’s simplicity. And it came with tradeoffs.
“There were a number of moments where the movement from Johnny Cardoso and Tanner Tessmann would ultimately help them in the buildup,” Davies says. “They found Weston McKennie in the pocket. He’d play it to Christian Pulisic, and then they’d get out. They would find ways to break down Belgium’s mid-block.” They would get Weah and Antonee Robinson, the fullbacks, on the ball in dangerous positions.
“But in doing that,” Davies says, “multiple times, they also got exposed.”
Dealing with Doku
Pochettino, at his post-match news conference, brushed aside discussion of the formation switch. He also said that Weah, a converted winger, “defended really, really well.” The “problem,” Pochettino argued, “was that no one helped (Weah) in the last third, in the areas that are really important to help.”
“The plan,” Weah confirmed, “was to double team” Doku. A midfielder would slide over to help. And for most of 45 minutes, Cardoso, Tessmann and McKennie did this reasonably well. They’d be responsible if Doku cut inside.
If, on the other hand, Doku went toward the end line, Weah would be prepared to keep up and block the cross. When settled and with inside help, Weah did this reasonably well on all but one occasion.
In the 45th minute, though, the “help” was too passive. McKennie and Tessmann both retreated into the box… but never stepped up to confront Doku when the Belgian winger came inside.
Doku’s shot was palmed away by Turner, but in part because he’d drawn so much attention, the rebound found Zeno Debast in loads of space outside the box. Debast had time to line up a fizzing 25-yard drive. Multiple U.S. players were slow to close him down. Matt Turner was slow across his goal. And just like that, it was 1-1.
Zeno Debast squeezes it past Matt Turner from long range 🎯 pic.twitter.com/PDFEUj6Kvt
— B/R Football (@brfootball) March 28, 2026
That Belgian goal, however, was the outlier.
USMNT gets caught in transition
On the second Belgium goal and the sequence that led to the third, the root cause didn’t seem to be a lack of help; it was a lack of structure.
Even in the first half, there were warning signs. In the 37th minute, the U.S. had taken up its in-possession shape, with Weah on the right wing. Turner mis-hit a pass, possession turned over, and suddenly, Doku was running at Cardoso one-v-one — with Weah trailing the play.
Then, in the 52nd minute, Weah was attacking deep in the final third. He helped set up a Pulisic chance. Moments later, he was racing back toward the defensive third, chasing Kevin De Bruyne. De Bruyne fed Doku, who ran at U.S. center back Mark McKenzie — with Weah once again trailing.
Seven U.S. players in total scrambled back into the penalty box to help. But that left Andre Onana free at the top of the box to put Belgium ahead — and remind U.S. fans of nightmares past.
“What pisses me off is that the same weaknesses of younger U.S. squads still seem to be there,” Davies says. “They collapse into their own 18-yard box and defend. And it’s almost like a psychological thing: if you have numbers in the box, back, you feel like you’re defending, and you’ve got the numerical advantage in front of your goal. But ultimately, they leave the top of the box always open for late runs, for people who are just lurking at the top.”
Amadou Onana’s first international goal for Belgium turns it around 🇧🇪 pic.twitter.com/6iJnWyQjxe
— B/R Football (@brfootball) March 28, 2026
Three minutes later, the structural flaws emerged again.
In the 55th minute, on one end, Weah advanced all the way into Belgium’s penalty box and sliced a volley off target.
“He was almost like a right wingback on that play,” Davies says. The problem, of course, is that he’d been tasked with defending like a true fullback, with only two central defenders to cover for him.
Weah lingered high up the field after that chance as the U.S. pressed Belgium.
When Belgium cycled the ball to the opposite side, easily evading the USMNT’s first line of confrontation, Weah began to retreat — but not quickly enough. His positioning allowed a Belgian defender to ping a 70-yard diagonal to Doku — a pass that should never be completeable.
Weah was suddenly scrambling and isolated. Tessmann hurried back to help but didn’t arrive in time. Doku beat Weah with a give-and-go. His shot was saved by Turner, but the follow-up earned Belgium a penalty. And the game, for all intents and purposes, was gone.
‘That’s what I don’t like about this fluid 4-2-3-1’
This is the peril of playing a shape-shifting 4-2-3-1 rather than a relatively simple 3-4-3.
With the ball, the USMNT builds in a 3-2-5 shape. When set up in a 3-4-3, two of the “4” — the wingbacks — simply have to join the front three.
To get to it from a 4-2-3-1 base, on the other hand, two of the back “4” — the fullbacks — were joining the front line on Saturday; one of the “2” holding midfielders had to fill for them; and one of the “3” had to fill for him.
Back in September, when the U.S. switched to the 3-4-3, “we didn’t have guys moving from one position to another,” captain Tim Ream said. There were no convoluted rotations from defense to attack or vice versa. “We were already set in that structure.”
In the 4-2-3-1, the movements provide attacking benefits, which is seemingly why Pochettino likes it.
“This is his formation, this is where he feels most comfortable,” Davies says.
“But in defensive transition — that’s what I don’t like about this fluid 4-2-3-1, with a center mid dropping deep,” Davies continues. “At least when you’re not typically a team that’s keeping possession. If you’re a team like Spain, go ahead. When you don’t do that consistently, and you have this type of formation, that’s when things get tough in transition.”
The ‘intensity’ dip
Pochettino’s main explanation for the collapse was a drop in “intensity.” On Belgium’s first goal, and again on the second, “we were not aggressive enough,” Pochettino said.
Davies saw this too, especially after the second goal went in. “You could see heads drop,” Davies says. “And they’re like, ‘Oh s***, here we go again.’”
That was perhaps most evident on Belgium’s fourth goal. When the ball switched from left to right, Pulisic simply let Belgian right back Thomas Meunier carry it from his defensive half into the final third. Cristian Roldan, therefore, was forced to step in, halt Meunier’s progress and track his run, leaving substitute fullback Max Arfsten one-v-one with Dodi Lukebakio. Arfsten got crossed, Lukebakio dipped inside, and multiple U.S. players just watched Lukebakio pick out the top corner.
Dodi Lukébakio finds the top corner in style 😮💨
Belgium lead USMNT 4-1 ❗ pic.twitter.com/ImclyAO8Xw
— B/R Football (@brfootball) March 28, 2026
Lukebakio dueling Arfsten also represented the gap in quality between the two squads. Belgium called upon substitutes from Benfica and Juventus. The U.S. brought in players from MLS. After those substitutions, the U.S. struggled to connect many progressive passes. Sebastian Berhalter, for example, looked out of his depth.
The gap between the starting 11s was slimmer. And intensity can close some quality gaps.
“I feel pretty damn good about that first half,” Davies says. “It’s kind of what you would hope for when you’re talking about a competitive match against Belgium.”
But when focus and energy slipped, quality rose to the surface — just like it did when the U.S. lost to Germany in 2023 and the Netherlands in 2022.
All eyes will be on Tuesday’s response vs. Portugal.
